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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
also succumb to the ascending sixth amendment of the Constitution as
defendants seek other privileged information. 4
Finally, the requirement that a judge make a preliminary determina-
tion before ordering in camera inspection of confidential information
when a statutory privilege conflicts with a criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right should provide adequate protection for newsmen against
unreasonable disclosure. Although some chilling effect on both sources
and reporters will occur, it seems correct to elevate a defendant's rights
above this privilege. Because of the interest and publicity the Farber case
has generated, it is expected to cause other states to pass shield statutes. If
this happens, reporters would be protected in states where they are not
currently protected, and a reporter could be certain about the extent of his
privilege in a given state. The enactment of a shield statute would protect
confidential sources in all situations except those where the statute con-
flicted with a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right of compulsory
process. In the long run, if more states pass shield statutes, and newsmen.
discover that most judges are able to make fair determinations of need and
materiality, the Farber decision will be recognized as containing benefits
as well as detriments for reporters.
MORLEY SWINGLE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA AS A
MATTER OF RIGHT WHEN
PLEA AGREEMENT IS REJECTED
Schellert v. State1
Patrick Schellert, the defendant, was charged with feloniously writing
a check for over one hundred dollars without sufficient funds for pay-
ment.2 He appeared on the trial date without counsel and pled guilty. The
deep roots in the common law. Examples are the lawyer-client privilege,
WIGMORE, supra, at § 2290, and the husband-wife privilege, id. § 2333. When
any of these privileges conflicts with a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right of compulsory process, the privileges that have a common law history might
be less likely to fall than the purely statutory privileges.
48. Eckhardt & McKey, supra note 17, at 86-87.
1. 569 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
2. Apparently Schellert was convicted under RSMO § 561.460 (1978).
Under the new criminal code which went into effectJanuary 1, 1979, the amount
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prosecuting attorney informed the court that the defendant's guilty plea
was being made pursuant to a plea agreement in which the prosecutor had
agreed to recommend probation. The judge asked the defendant if he
understood that the prosecutor's recommendation was merely a recom-
mendation, and that the court was free to impose different punishment.
The defendant replied, "Yes, sir, I'm very well aware of that."3 The court
accepted 4 the guilty plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. On the
date set for sentencing, appellant again appeared without the benefit of
counsel. The judge again reminded the defendant that the court was not
bound by the prosecutor's recommendation of probation and was free to
impose whatever sentence it deemed appropriate. At no time prior to im-
posing the sentence did the trial judge expressly declare that he was not
going to follow the recommendation. The court granted allocution and
then sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment.
The defendant subsequently filed a rule 27.26 motion 5 in which he
contended that his plea of guilty had been involuntary. 6 The trial court
overruled his motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Missouri Court
of Appeals, St. Louis District, affirmed the ruling. 7 After granting trans-
fer, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court
for the entry of a new plea. Addressing only one major issue in its opinion,
the supreme court overruled past Missouri precedent by holding that when
there is a plea agreement which contemplates a recommendation by the
prosecutor for a reduced sentence and the judge decides that he cannot
follow this recommended sentefice concession, the trial court is required to
of the insufficient funds check would have had to exceed $150 to constitute a class
D felony, where the maximum punishment exceeds six months.
3. 569 S.W.2d at 736.
4. The court also informed appellant of his rights being waived by the
guilty plea and determined that there was a f~ctual basis for the plea.
5. MO. R. CRIM. P. 27.26 provides in part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming a right to be released
on the ground that such sentence was imposed in violation of the Con-
stitution... or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may file a motion
at any time in the court which imposed such sentence to vacate, set aside
or correct the same .... Unless the motion and the files and records of
the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, a
prompt hearing thereon shall be held .... If the court finds that the
judgment was rendered without jurisdiction or that the sentence im-
posed was illegal or otherwise subject to collateral attack, or that there
was such a denial or infringement of the Constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment subject to collateral attack, the court
shall vacate and set aside the judgment and shall discharge the prisoner
or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may ap-
pear appropriate ....
6. Appellant also contended that he had not knowingly and intelligently
waived the assistance of counsel. Because of its disposition of the case on the in-
voluntary plea issue, the supreme court did not discuss this contention.
7. The court of appeals held that the trial court had followed previously ex-
isting law in conducting the guilty-plea proceeding.
1979]
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allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. In addition the supreme
court established a process to be followed in any guilty plea proceeding.
A long line of Missouri cases had held that a defendant could not with-
draw his guilty plea as a matter of right." Schellert changed this rule for the
situation where the trial judge declines to follow the recommendation of
the prosecutor. In an earlier case involving similar facts, Brown v. State,9
the court emphasized that the defendant had not been misled by anyone
into believing that the plea agreement was binding on the trial court, and
that the prosecutor had made the agreed recommendation. The court in
Brown reasoned that the fact that the defendant's plea resulted from bar-
gaining did not prevent it from being voluntary, even though the recom-
mendations for which the defendant had bargained were not allowed.1 0
After considering rule 27.25," which allows withdrawal of a guilty plea
when necessary to correct manifest injustice, the court held that the failure
of the trial court to follow the prosecutor's recommendation was not
manifest injustice. The defendant in Brown, therefore, was granted no
relief. In Schellert, the court expressly overruled its prior holding.
Schellert is important because, in addition to rejecting judicial prece-
dent, the majority opinion sets out a procedure for conducting a guilty
plea proceeding which complements that procedure set out by the concur-
ring opinion in Flood v. State. ' Taken together (and briefly summarized),
8. Beach v. State, 488 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1972); Watson v. State, 446 S.W.2d
763 (Mo. 1969); Vaughn v. State, 443 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1969); State v. Tyler, 440
S.W.2d 470 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Young v. State, 438 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. 1969);
Drew v. State, 436 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1969); State v. Mountjoy, 420 S.W.2d 316
(Mo. 1967); State v. Nielsen, 547 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); State v.
Jackson, 514 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974); Huffman v. State, 499
S.W.2d 565 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
9. 485 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1972).
10. Id. at 430.
11. Mo. R. CRIM. P. 27.25 provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence
is imposed or when imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct
manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
12. 476 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1972). The court set out in full the following pro-
cedures:
If defendant's plea is guilty:
a. before accepting plea:
(1) ascertain and make finding that defendant:
(a) is acting voluntarily (if in doubt, consider whether the defen-
dant should be given a mental examination, V.A.M.S. §
552.020);
(b) fully understands his rights;
(c) fully understands the consequences of his plea;
(d) is in fact guilty;
(2) explain and ask defendant if he understands:
(a) that the court need not accept his plea unless satisfied of
defendant's guilt and that the defendant fully understands
798 [Vol. 44
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Flood and Schellert contemplate the following procedure when the defen-
dant renders a guilty plea:
1. Before accepting the plea the trial judge should ascertain and
make a finding that the defendant
(a) is acting voluntarily;
(b) fully understands his rights;
(c) fully understands the consequences of his plea; and
(d) is in fact guilty.
2. Before accepting the plea the judge should inquire whether
there is a plea agreement.
(a) If there is a plea agreement, the trial judge should:
(i)'require that it be disclosed on the record at the time the
.plea is offered; and
(ii) accept or reject the agreement or defer the decision as
his rights;
(b) that if he pleads not guilty he would be entitled to a speedy
and public trial by a judge or jury;
(c) that at such trial the State would have to confront him with
the witnesses upon whose testimony it relied to obtain a con-
viction, and he would have the right to cross-examine these
witnesses;
(d) that at such trial he would be presumed innocent until such
time, if ever, as the State established his guilt by competent
evidence to the satisfaction of the judge or jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt;
(e) that at such trial he would be entitled to compulsory process
to call witnesses;
(f) the nature and essential elements of the charge to which he is
pleading;
(g) the range of penalties to which he is subjecting himself by his
plea including the maximum sentence;
(3) ask defendant:
(a) if any threats or promises have been made to induce him to
plead guilty;
(b) if he believes there is any understanding or if any predictions
have been made to him concerning the sentence he will
receive;
(c) if he committed the offense;
(d) just what he did (obtain admission of necessary acts, know-
ledge, and intent);
(e) if he still wishes to plead guilty;
(f) any additional questions required by the circumstances;
(4) ask defense counsel if he knows any reason why defendant should
not plead guilty;
b. accept or reject plea;
c.. if plea is rejected, or if defendant refuses to plead, enter a plea of not
guilty and set date for trial;
d. if plea is accepted, enter an order finding that the plea is made volun-
tarily with understanding of the nature of the charge, and is therefore
accepted.
Id. at 535-36 (Donnelly, J., concurring).
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to acceptance or rejection until there has been an
opportunity to consider the pre-sentence report.
(b) If the plea agreement contemplates the granting of sen-
tencing concessions, the trial judge should give the agree-
ment due consideration, but notwithstanding its
existence, he should reach an independent decision on
whether to grant the sentence concessions.
(c) If the court rejects the plea agreement, either at the time
of the plea proceedings or at the time of sentencing, the
court shall, on the record
(i) inform the parties of that fact;
(ii) advise the defendant personally that the court is not
bound by the plea agreement;
(iii) afford the defendant the opportunity then to
withdraw his plea; and
(iv) advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty
plea, the disposition of the case may be less favorable
to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea
agreement.
(d) If the agreement is rejected and the defendant wishes to
withdraw his plea, if defendant refuses to plead, or if the
plea is rejected, the court should enter a plea of not guilty,
and set date for trial.
(e) If the plea is accepted, the court should enter an order
finding that the plea is made voluntarily with understand-
ing of the nature of the charge, and is therefore accepted.
This procedure articulated by Schellert s gets the plea agreement in the
record. Further, it allows for withdrawal of guilty pleas when the trial
court rejects the plea agreement. 14
13. The court in Schellert described the proper procedure as follows:
The trial judge should not accept a plea of guilty without first inquiring
whether there is a plea agreement and, if there is one, requiring that it be
disclosed on the record in open court, or on a showing of good cause, in
camera, at the time the plea is offered. Thereupon the court may accept
or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or
rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence
report.
If the plea agreement contemplates the granting of sentence conces-
sions by the trial judge, he should give the agreement due consideration,
but notwithstanding its existence reach an independent decision on
whether to grant sentence concessions. If the court rejects the plea agree-
ment, either at the time of the plea proceedings or at the time of sentenc-
ing, the court shall, on the record inform the parties of that fact, advise
the defendant personally in open court, or on a showing of good cause, in
camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the
defendant the opportunity then to withdraw his plea, and advise the
defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea, the disposition of the case
may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the
plea agreement.
569 S.W.2d at 739.
14. This procedure is virtually identical to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2) which
800 [Vol. 44
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In practical effect the Schellert procedure amends15 rule 27.25 by judi-
cial decision.' 6 It seems most likely that the "amendment" will be limited
to cases where there is a rejected plea agreement.1 7 In other situations,
whether to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea will still rest in the sound
discretion of the trial court.1 8 For example, if the defendant merely dis-
covers that the government's case is not as strong as he thought, he will not
be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.' 9 An important factor that the trial
court will consider is whether prejudice to the government has resulted
from the guilty plea. 20
If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on
the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a
showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. There-
upon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its deci-
sion as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity
to consider the presentence report.
FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(e)(4) provides:
If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, in-
form the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open
court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not
bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to
then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his
guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be
less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea
agreement.
15. 569 S.W.2d at 740. The rule of Schellert is to operate prospectively only.
This was done, presumably, to prevent the large number of rule 27.25 and rule
27.26 motions which would ensue if prisoners were allowed to assert that the trial
judge had not followed these procedures in guilty plea proceedings occurring
before Schellert. This is often done when this type of procedural decision is made.
See, e.g., King v. State, 553 P.2d 529 (Okla. Grim. App. 1976).
16. 569 S.W.2d at 740 (concurring opinion).
17. See the express terms of the Schellert rule in note 13 supra. There is a
difference in the rights of defendants depending on whether there is a plea agree-
ment. See Commonwealth v. Sutherland, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 520, 524, 340 A.2d
582, 584 (1975). The guilty plea could become just a delay tactic if any guilty plea
could be withdrawn before sentencing as a matter of right. In some jurisdictions,
it could also become a ploy to get a different judge. See notes 69-72 and accompa-
nying text infra.
18. 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 504 (1965).
19. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).
20. United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1972)
(no prejudice to government shown, trial court should have allowed withdrawal);
United States v. Savage, 561 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1977) (withdrawal not allowed as
a matter of right, remanded for a determination of whether the government had
been prejudiced by defendant's guilty plea); United States v. Tabory, 462 F.2d
352 (4th Cir. 1972) (withdrawal not allowed, probable prejudice to government);
State v. Loyd, 291 Minn. 528, 190 N.W.2d 123 (1971) (no showing of prejudice,
withdrawal allowed); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 7, 335 A.2d
777 (1975) (no prejudice shown, withdrawal allowed). See State v. Doherty, 261
N.W.2d 677 (S.D. 1978) (no prejudice shown, withdrawal allowed); ABA STAN-
DARDS, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 2.1(b) (1968).
1979]
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The Schellert opinion points out the pervasiveness of the practice of
plea bargaining. 21 Although some commentators have argued that plea
bargaining should be eliminated, 22 the Missouri Supreme Court has given
formal recognition 23 to plea bargaining in Missouri 24 and has recognized it
as a highly desirable part of the criminal justice process. 25 The Schellert
procedure requires that if the guilty plea results from a plea agreement,
then that agreement must be made a part of the record. This seems to have
eliminated the problem of a defendant denying that there was a plea
agreement at trial and later claiming that his guilty plea was induced by a
promise which was never fulfilled. 26 In fact, if the trial courts follow the
Schellert and Flood procedures, practically all guilty plea convictions
should be insulated from subsequent collateral attack.27
The Schellert rule also allows for withdrawal of the defendant's guilty
plea as a matter of right when the plea agreement has been rejected. 28 This
precise issue has never been passed upon by the United States Supreme
Court. 29 There is a split of authority among the many courts that have con-
fronted the issue, and it is difficult to determine which is the majority posi-
21. Reliable statistical information is limited but some estimates indicate
that guilty pleas account for the disposition of as many as 95% of all criminal
cases with a substantial number of these resulting from plea discussions. 8
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.01[4], at 11-11 (2d ed. 1978).
22. See, e.g., Parnes & Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14
GRIM. L. BULL. 101 (1978).
23. Apparently the Missouri Supreme Court concurred in this position
taken by State v. Doherty, 261 N.W.2d 677, 681 (S.D. 1978), that "[a]lthough the
current high visibility of plea bargaining has stirred much controversy, recogni-
tion of the existence of plea bargaining, with proper supervision, is preferable to
nonrecognition which would not eradicate the practice but merely return it to the
unsupervised and unpublicized manner practiced in years past." Doherty relied
upon Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1970).
24. "Properly administered it should be used and should be encouraged."
569 S.W.2d at 739.
25. Plea bargaining is characterized as "an essential- component of the
criminal justice system, satisfying many useful purposes." 569 S.W.2d at 739.
26. This problem is illustrated in United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d
326 (4th Cir. 1975). The problem also surfaced in a line of Missouri cases. The
leading case was Burgin v. State, 522 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975).
Burgin and its progeny, including Williams v. State, 560 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1978); Giggar v. State, 560 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); and
Mainord v. State, 541 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976), all involved claims
by the appellants that they had been instructed by their lawyers to deny the ex-
istence of any agreement with the prosecutor.
27. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
28. An interesting question, not raised by Schellert, is whether the defen-
dant must assert his innocence in this situation. Cf. State v. Griffin, 238 N.W.2d
780, 781 (Iowa 1976) (defendant need not assert his innocence).
29. Neely v. Pennsylvania, 411 U.S. 954 (1973) (dissenting opinion). The
right to withdraw has been discussed in dissents in Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S.
250, 259 (1972) and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971).
[Vol. 44802
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tion.30 It does seem that there is a trend toward deciding the issue in the
same way that Schellert has decided it,31 although there is authority which
takes the opposite view.
3 2
Those states which do not allow withdrawal of the guilty plea in this
situation are promoting the public policy of preserving the independence
of the trial court 33 from the plea bargaining process.3 4 These jurisdictions
do not want anything to fetter the discretion of the trial judge.3 5 States like
Missouri which do allow withdrawal of guilty pleas as a matter of right
when the judge declines to follow the prosecutor's recommendation3 6 are
promoting the public policy of "substantial fairness" to the defendant.
3 7
30. Compare Alschuler, The TrialJudge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1072 (1976) ("most state courts have refused to permit
defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas when prosecutorial recommendations
have been disregarded") with Comment, Withdrawal of the Plea of Guilty Upon a
Decision by the Judge Not to Accept the Plea Agreement, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 342,
353 (1976) ("[t]he majority of courts dealing with the issue have permitted with-
drawal when the judge fails to incorporate the agreement in his sentence").
31. Three state supreme courts decided cases with the same issue as Schellert
during 1978. All three reached the same result as Schellert. People v. Wright, 573
P.2d 551 (Colo. 1978); Eller v. State, 92 N.M. 52, 582 P.2d 824 (1978); State v.
Doherty, 261 N.W.2d 677 (S.D. 1978). Other fairly recent cases which agree with
the Schellert result are State v. Griffin, 238 N.W.2d 780 (Iowa 1976); State v.
Goodrich, 116 N.H. 477, 363 A.2d 425 (1976); Kingv. State, 553 P.2d 529 (Okla.
Grim. App. 1976).
32. United States v. Savage, 561 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Futeral, 539 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1975); Miles v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 638 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Sarubbi, 416 F. Supp. 633 (D.NJ. 1976); State v. Cagnina, 113 Ariz. 387, 555
P.2d 345 (1976); State v. Adams, 342 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1977); State v. Gumienny,
58 Hawaii 304, 568 P.2d 1194 (1977); People v. Lambrecht, 69 Ill. 2d 544, 372
N.E.2d 641 (1977); Haver v. State, 162 Ind. App. 93, 317 N.E.2d 884 (1974);
Kane v. State, 114 R.I. 406, 333 A.2d 684 (1975); Cruz v. State, 530 S.W.2d 817
(Tex. Grim. App. 1975); State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976); In re
Hughes, 19 Wash. App. 155, 575 P.2d 252 (1978).
33. A couple of questions regarding the independence of trial judges were
not raised by Schellert but are quite interesting. First, are there occasions when it
would be error for the trial judge not to accept the agreement? According to
United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the answer is yes.
Stewart v. State, 568 P.2d 1297 (Okla. Grim. App. 1977), on the other hand, says
no. Secondly, can the trial judge insist that specific terms be included in the
agreement? People v. Bennett, 16 Ill. App. 3d 972, 307 N.E.2d 176 (1974) says
no.
34. State v. Gumienny, 58 Hawaii 304, 307, 568 P.2d 1194, 1197 (1977).
35. In re Hughes, 19 Wash. App. 155, 575 P.2d 252 (1978); See State v.
Cagnina, 113 Ariz. 387, 555 P.2d 345 (1976); State v. Gumienny, 58 Hawaii 304,
568 P.2d 1194 (1977); Cruz v. State, 530 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Grim. App. 1975);
State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976); TEX. R. GRIM. P. ANN. 26.13 (Ver-
non) (Supp. 1978).
36. The language actually used in Schellert is "rejects the agreement." See
note 13 supra. For the potential significance of this distinction, see text accompa-
nying notes 55-68 infra.
37. 569 S.W.2d at 737.
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Schellert stands for the proposition that it is substantially unfair for the
defendant to be persuaded to enter the bargain with hopes of a sentence
concession, only to have a judge impose an entirely different and harsher
sentence. "To say in these circumstances that all which was bargained for
and agreed to was fulfilled by the prosecutor's mere act of recommending
probation would reduce the bargain to a trap, or, at best, a formality. '38
The defendant's "reasonable" expectation that his bargain will be carried
out should not be frustrated.3 9
The reason that the defendant pleads guilty in return for a sentence
recommendation from the prosecutor is often to avoid the risk which
results from jury trials. If the defendant were taking the same sentencing
risk with a guilty plea, 40 it would be foolish for the defendant to waive his
constitutional rights4I by pleading guilty. Since a guilty plea results in a
waiver of several constitutional rights, the guilty plea must be scrutinized
to see that it is knowing and voluntary. The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution has been interpreted
to mandate that every guilty plea be entered knowingly and voluntarily. 42
The courts require that the record must disclose that this requirement has
been met. 43
The possibility that the defendant will misunderstand the guilty plea
proceeding presents another policy reason for allowing withdrawal of the
plea. Despite the fact that the trial judge warns the defendant that the
court is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation, the defendant
may very well have the impression that the warning is just a formality; that
38. People v. Wright, 573 P.2d 551, 553 (Colo. 1978), quoting Thomas v.
State, 327 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. App. 1976).
39. See McMahon v. State, 569 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
40. Even if there is no plea agreement, some defendants may plead guilty
because they think the judge will be more lenient with them than if they were
found guilty after exercising their constitutional right to a trial by jury. This no-
tion is referred to as "implicit plea bargaining." In United States v. Resnick, 483
F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1973), the defendant presented a unique argument. The
defendant had been offered a plea agreement with a recommended sentence
which the trial court had indicated was acceptable. The defendant decided not to
accept the plea agreement offer and pled not guilty. He was found guilty and
received a sentence which was harsher than the one that the judge had earlier
found to be acceptable. The defendant's argument was that he was being pun-
ished for exercising his fifth and sixth amendment rights. His argument was re-
jected, but it does seem to have some merit. If the trial judge does, as a matter of
routine, give stiffer sentences to those who plead not guilty, then it seems that
"implicit plea bargaining" does infringe on the fifth and sixth amendment rights
of the defendant.
41. A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to a jury trial, to confront
one's accusers, to present witnesses in one's defense, to remain silent, and to be
convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
43. Id. at 243.
804 [Vol. 44
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as a practical matter the judge always goes along with the recommenda-
tion. 44 In Schellert, the supreme court recognized the very real danger that
from the defendant's viewpoint this warning may be seen as mere court-
room rhetoric. 41
An important question that Schellert does not answer is whether the
Missouri courts now have a certain ritual that must be followed. If there is
a deviation from the procedure recommended by Judge Donnelly's concur-
ring opinion in Flood v. State,4 6 or from the procedure set out in
Schellert47 for disclosure of plea agreements, would this be sufficient to
give the defendant the right to withdraw his guilty plea? If a certain ritual
is required in the plea proceeding, a deviation from the ritual would be
presumed prejudicial error and the defendant would be entitled to plead
anew. 4" McMahon v. State,49 handed down the same day as Schellert,
probably has put this question to rest in Missouri. McMahon provides that
"the test of whether a plea is voluntarily and intelligently made is not
whether a particular ritual is followed or whether each and every detail is
explained to a defendant but whether the plea in fact is intelligently and
voluntarily made."5 0
There also may be some question as to how specific the trial judge must
be in rejecting the plea agreement. Schellert says the court must "inform
the parties of that fact."'" Will the defendant and his counsel be able to
distinguish the court's rejection of the agreement from his customary
warning that the court is not bound by the plea agreement? Must the trial
judge affirmatively and specitically offer the defendant a chance to with-
draw his plea? When must this offer be made? McMahon may again be of
some help in resolving these ambiguities. The McMahon fact situation was
similar to Schellert. Pursuant to a plea agreement the prosecutor had
recommended a sentence of five to eight years. The trial judge in
McMahon, unlike the one in Schellert, informed the defendant at the guilty
plea proceeding that "I don't want you to think you may get by with only
five or eight years, do you understand that?" The defendant replied in the
44. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 30, at 1064. A sample of 1000 cases in
Houston involving ten judges is discussed. Three of the judges followed the prose-
cution's recommendations in 100% of the cases. One judge followed the recom-
mendation in 88 % of the cases. The remaining judges followed the recommenda-
tion in 92-99% of the cases. See United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 1119, 1123
(9th Cir. 1977); State v. Goodrich, 116 N.H. 477,479, 363 A.2d 425, 426 (1976);
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 48 (1966).
45. 569 S.W.2d at 738. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 78 (1977);
Alschuler, supra note 30, at 1065-69.
46. The procedure is set out in note 12 supra.
47. The procedure is set out in note 13 supra.
48. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1969).
49. 569 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
50. Id. at 758.
51. 569 S.W.2d at 739.
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affirmative. The trial judge then inquired, "You still want to plead guilty
knowing that?' 5 2 The defendant persisted in his guilty plea, and the sen-
tence was for thirteen years. On this record, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that the guilty plea proceeding complied "in essence with the prin-
ciples laid down in Schellert."' 5 3 The supreme court did not allow the
defendant to withdraw his plea. It did, however, make a suggestion to trial
courts that the better practice would be "for the trial court at the time of
sentencing and after receiving a presentence investigation to then inform
the defendant and counsel that the court rejects the plea agreement and at
that time afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea."' 4
Despite the Schellert decision, there are several unresolved questions
remaining in the area of the withdrawn guilty plea. One involves the
meaning of the word "reject." The crucial condition precedent to a defen-
dant gaining the right to withdraw his plea is that the trial court "rejects
the plea agreement." 55 Though the meaning of "reject" may seem obvious,
several courts have had difficulty determining its meaning in this context.
The federal courts, in interpreting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(e), have reached a surprising result. United States v. Sarubbi56 is the
leading case; it reaches the conclusion that "nonacceptance of the request
is not a rejection of the agreement, and so is not within Rule 11(e)[4]. '"57
The court looked to congressional intent and decided that "Congress
would have had no reason to use the critical language for the type B58
agreement unless it meant that the agreement could be both approved and
satisfied even though the recommendation or request failed to persuade
the court to impose the very sentence recommended or requested." 59
Sarubbi was followed and its rationale adopted in both United States v.
Savage60 and United States v. Henderson.61 The interpretation of the
federal rule is that a judge can give a more severe sentence than that
recommended without rejecting the agreement. Thus, in the Schellert fact
situation the federal courts which have confronted the issue would say the
52. McMahon v. State, 569 S.W.2d 753, 760 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
53. Id.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. 569 S.W.2d at 739.
56. 416 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1976).
57. Id. at 636 (court cites FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1), although obviously in-
tending to refer to 11(e)(4)).
58. FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(e)(1) provides for three types of plea agreements.
Type A allows the attorney for the government to "move for dismissal of other
charges." Type B allows the attorney for the government to "make a recommen-
dation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a particular sentence,
with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be bind-
ing upon the court." Type C allows the attorney for the government to "agree that
a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case."
59. United States v. Sarubbi, 416 F. Supp. 633, 636-37 (D.N.J. 1976).
60. 561 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1977).
61. 565 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1977)..
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defendant has no right to withdraw his guilty plea. Henderson, however,
does suggest that a judge who is going to impose a sentence that is substan-
tially more onerous than that recommended ought to allow the defendant
to withdraw his guilty plea, even though the rule does not so require. 62
The supreme courts of two states have expressly rejected the Sarubbi
line of cases. Eller v. State63 says the Sarubbi interpretation is too narrow.
"If the trial court rejects the 'plea agreement' the defendant must be given
an opportunity to withdraw his plea. It is implicit in a plea agreement that
the court will either accept the recommendation and plea to the charges,
or reject both the recommendation and the plea." 64 State v. Doherty65
solved the problem by using a different approach. The court expressly dis-
approved of a "sentence recommendation."6 6 The guideline adopted was
that the prosecuting attorney should either agree not to oppose the defen-
dant's request or agree that a particular sentence is'proper. When handled
in this manner, the defendant will not be as apt to be misled by the trial
court's sentencing prerogatives. 67 The Doherty court reasoned that this ap-
proach would promote the two policies that other courts have thought to
be conflicting. The trial court retains its sentencing discretion by being
able to reject any sentence concession that it considers inappropriate. At
the same time, this approach prevents any confusion and misunderstand-
ing on the part of a defendant who has pled guilty on the basis of a prom-
ise for a sentence recommendation which he has been led to believe will be
followed by the court.
Schellert did not expressly disapprove of the Sarubbi line of cases as
had both Eller and Doherty. The procedure established in Schellert is vir-
tually identical to the federal procedural rule interpreted by Sarubbi, and
the federal rule is cited with approval by the Schellert court. 68 Thus, it is
arguable that the federal interpretation of the rule should be followed in
Missouri. The actual disposition of the Schellert case, however, rebuts this
argument and leads one to believe that Missouri courts will handle the
problem as both Eller and Doherty have done.
A second unresolved question remaining after Schellert is whether the
defendant who withdraws his guilty plea as a matter of right is entitled to a
different judge when he does so. Suppose the defendant pleads guilty as a
result of a plea bargain. Pursuant to the bargain, the prosecutor recom-
mends a light sentence. According to Schellert, the trial judge must satisfy
himself that there is a factual basis for the plea. 69 After doing so the judge
62. Id. at 1123.
63. 92 N.M. 52, 582 P.2d 824 (1978).
64. Id. at 53, 582 P.2d at 825.
65. 261 N.W.2d 677 (S.D. 1978).
66.. Id. at 681.
67. Id.
68. 569 S.W.2d at 737 (former rule 11); id. at 740 (Finch, J., concurring).
69. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f); Flood v. State, 476 S.W.2d 529, 536 (Mo.
1972) (Donnelly, J., concurring); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
1979]
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decides to give a harsher sentence than the one recommended. The trial
court then offers the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
If the defendant does withdraw his plea, it will be prejudicial to the defen-
dant to have this same judge hear his case. The question then devolves to
whether the defendant is entitled to a new judge automatically in this
situation, or whether the original judge need recuse himself only at his
discretion. A few cases have indicated that the defendant is entitled to a
different judge,70 but most cases which present this fact situation are silent
on the question. One may infer, however, that if those courts which re-
mained silent had thought it necessary to remove this decision from the
trial court's discretion, then they would specifically have done so. One case
in which the defendant asked for a per se rule that a judge who rejects a
guilty plea should not be allowed to preside at the subsequent jury trial was
United States v. Gallington.7 ' Gallington held that a judge may recuse
himself and should give serious consideration to doing so, but left it in the
sound discretion of the trial judge. 72 As where a criminal case is remanded
to the trial court after appeal, the same trial judge may preside over the
case a second time as a matter of routine.
A third unsettled question remaining after Schellert is whether spe-
cific performance of the plea agreement is ever an acceptable remedy.
73
Schellert only discusses the remedy of allowing the defendant to withdraw
his plea when the plea agreement becomes aborted. There are times, how-
ever, when withdrawal of the plea will not restore the defendant to his pre-
agreement position. For example, the defendant may have cooperated
with the police 74 or may have given testimony for the prosecution. As a
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.6 (1968).
70. United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975); People v. Kaanehe,
19 Cal. 3d 1, 559 P.2d 1028, 136 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1977); People v. Lambrecht, 69
Ill. 2d 544, 372 N.E.2d 641 (1977); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 234 Pa. Super. Ct.
7, 335 A.2d 777 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barrett, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 163, 299
A.2d 30 (1972). Contra, United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637 (8th Cir.
1973).
71. 488 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 639-40.
73. Compare People v. Kaaneke, 19 Cal. 3d 1, 559 P.2d 1028, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 409 (1977) (recognizing availability of specific performance in an appro-
priate case) and People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604, 112 Cal. Rptr.
556 (1974) (no specific enforcement where judge withdrew his prior approval of a
plea bargain) with Davis v. State, 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1975) (plea bargain not
specifically enforceable). See generally Note, 9 CONN. L. REV. 483 (1977).
74. State v. Giuliano, 270 N.W.2d 33 (S.D. 1978), points out some prob-
lems with this type plea agreement. In Giuliano, the police investigation went
bad and the prosecutor claimed that the defendant had not performed his part of
the bargain. The defendant claimed he was prejudiced by having to withdraw his
plea. His conviction was affirmed, but an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part stated that a trial court should reject any plea agreement whose terms
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result, the defendant may have less bargaining power, or may have given
evidence incriminating himself. While it is true that his actual statements
cannot be used as an admission7 5 when the plea is withdrawn, the defen-
dant's position nonetheless may have been weakened.
The Schellert decision promotes both judicial efficiency and fairness
to individual defendants. It should increase the number of bargained guilty
pleas by removing the gamble from this type of bargain. 76 The decision
should also lessen the number of rule 27.25 and rule 27.26 motions and
habeas corpus petitions on the ground of an involuntary guilty plea. 77
Schellert, however, has important implications for prosecutors, trial
judges, and defense attorneys. Prosecutors would be wise to retain their
evidence against the defendant even after he pleads guilty. They should
always be prepared for a possible withdrawal of the plea. Most important-
ly, prosecutors should not make plea agreements to which the judge is
unlikely to agree. Trial judges should follow the procedures of Flood and
Schellert exactly. They should make it very clear to the defendant that
they are rejecting the agreement when they intend to levy a sentence stiffer
than the one recommended. In cases where it has discretion, the trial court
should be liberal in allowing withdrawal. 78 If these suggestions are not
carefully followed, Schellert could give rise to more rule 27.25 and rule
27.26 motions rather than fewer. The defense attorney should not allow
the remedy provided by Schellert to lull him into a false sense of security.
After the defendant has gone through the guilty plea procedure and the
judge has rejected the agreement, withdrawal may not be a realistic op-
tion, 79 particularly if it is probable that he will have the same judge pre-
siding over his jury trial.
JAMES MICHAEL PAYNE
75. State v. Hoopes, 534 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
76. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 30, at 1064. The cited material discusses
a sample of 1000 actual cases. The judge who followed the prosecution's recom-
mendation the least often also had the fewest number of guilty pleas in his court-
room. It may be inferred from this small sample that the less apt the judge is to
follow the prosecutor's recommendation, then the less apt the defendant is to
enter a plea agreement of this type.
77. See Flood v. State, 476 S.W.2d 529, 537 (Mo. 1972) (Ponnelly, J., con-
curring).
78. E.g., United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.
1972). The law prefers a trial on the merits. United States v. Klein, 560 F.2d 1236
(5th Cir. 1977); State v. Cochran, 332 Mo. 742, 745, 60 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1933).
79. See Alschuler, supra note 30, at 1072.
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